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Empirical studies measuring the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 on judicial proceedings confirm that the Charter has been 
particularly influential in the area of criminal law. Morton and Withey's 1987 
statistical analysis of Charter decisions, for example, found that some two-thirds 
of all reported Charter cases have been challenges to the conduct of police 
charged with enforcing the Criminal Code2 and other federal and provincial 
statutes.3 More recently, Morton's study of judicially nullified statutes4 reveals 
that, among federal statutes, the Criminal Code has been the most affected by 
the Charter, followed by the quasi-criminal Narcotics Control Act5 and the Food 
and Drugs Act.6 Moreover, the Charter rights that most frequently serve as the 
basis for annulling statutes are the "legal rights" set out in ss. 7-12. Of the 89 
successful Charter arguments against federal and provincial legislation between 
1982 and 1988, 49 were based on these legal rights.7 
The Charter has thus proved to be fertile jurisprudential soil for the re-
interpretation and constitutional "re-alignment" of criminal law doctrine in 
Canada. Don Stuart's Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law is an 
important attempt to examine and assess this constitutional re-alignment. 
* Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. anticipated 1994. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. 
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. 
3 F.L. Morton and M.J. Withey, "Charting the Charter, 1982-1985: A Statistical 
Analysis" (1987) Canadian Human Rights Yearbook 65, at 72-74. 
4 F.L. Morton, G. Solomon, I. McNish and D.W. Poulton, "Judicial Nullification of 
Statutes Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982-1988" (1990) 28 Alta. L.R. 
396, at406. 
5 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1. 
6 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
7 Ibid. 
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Criminal law, as Stuart notes, has become constitutionalized "to an extent that 
demands careful study and knowledge by the legal profession."8 Perhaps the 
most obvious consequence of this "constitutionalization" is that students and 
practitioners of criminal law must also become fluent in the substantive and 
interpretive principles of Charter litigation. If a defence to a criminal charge 
rests on arguing successfully the unconstitutionality of the charge, then it is clear 
that criminal law can no longer be considered in a constitutional vacuum. 
Moreover, by elevating many of the fundamental principles of criminal law 
to the status of "the supreme law of Canada"9 - principles such as the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty, or the right not to be arbitrarily detained 
or imprisoned - the Charter has simultaneously breathed new life and meaning 
into them. It has also authorized the judicial refashioning of significant aspects 
of the criminal law in Canada. As Madame Justice McLachlin has observed: 
A legal rule [formerly] relevant to a fundamental right may be 
too narrow to be reconciled with the philosophy and approach 
of the Charter and the purpose of the Charter guarantee. 10 
Charter Justice traces the central authorities and arguments in the interpretation 
of these fundamental rights and principles in order to provide the reader with a 
practical understanding of how they function in Canadian courts today. 
Structurally, Charter Justice is subdivided into chapters according to the 
Charter sections with which the book is primarily concerned, namely ss. 1, 7 -
15 and 24. This structure is logical given the aim of the text; Stuart is not 
concerned with revisiting basic criminal law doctrine, except as it has been 
affected by or is relevant to, the Charter. Rather than using basic criminal law 
principles as points of departure and then analyzing them in light of the Charter, 
Stuart in effect does the reverse. Each Charter right serves as a window through 
which he explores and assesses the jurisprudential history, and the impact on 
challenged criminal law provisions and doctrines. 
This approach is particularly well-suited to criminal lawyers and to students 
who wish to make Charter arguments and require a practical guide to 
understanding both general and specific principles of Charter criminal litigation. 
Charter Justice was written following a sabbatical year during which Stuart 
worked full-time as a prosecutor in the busy trial courts of Toronto. Given the 
great volume of Charter case law that has accumulated, and the complexity of 
8 D. Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 1991) at 
vi [hereinafter Charter Justice]. 
9 Sees. 52 (the "supremacy clause") of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
CanadaAct 1982(U.K.), 1982,c. ll. 
10 R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151at164. 
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Charter issues - many of which, as Stuart notes, are yet to be resolved 
decisively by the courts - there is clearly a need for a text that will allow the 
practising lawyer to sift quickly and thoroughly through the pertinent law. 
Charter Justice is both sufficiently broad in scope, and practically structured, to 
meet this need. 
In substance, too, Charter Justice offers a great deal to either the interested 
reader or the practising lawyer. The book is well-researched, comprehensive, 
and succinct. For each Charter right examined, Stuart thoroughly canvasses the 
relevant case law and provides the reader with footnoted secondary sources for 
further discussion. Where the law appears problematic or inconsistent, he 
critically assesses it and suggests alternative solutions. Stuart quotes from court 
decisions, but only if these are authoritative and provide the reader with the 
substantive meaning of the right in question or the ratio of the case. If the case 
contains a passage that has become well recognized due to frequent citing, Stuart 
appropriately includes it as well. For example, the reader is reminded that 
Viscount Sankey referred to the constitution as a "living tree capable of growth 
and expansion," 11 but also that, as per Mahoney, J.A., "even the liveliest of 
living trees takes time to grow - it is a tree, not a weed." 12 While these dicta are 
not always precise statements of the law, they are nonetheless important because 
they familiarize the reader with the broader discourse that has evolved from the 
cases. They also enliven the reading. 
The first chapter addresses the basic principles of any litigation utilizing 
Charter argumentation. Included are the principles relating to purposive 
interpretation, 13 waiver, 14 jurisdiction, 15 onus and standard of proof,16 and 
extrinsic evidence. 17 The chapter also provides a critical review of s. 1 analyses 
by the Supreme Court in a number of recent cases since the "authoritative 
blueprint" case, R. v. Oakes. 18 Stuart argues that the formalistic approach laid 
down by the Supreme Court in Oakes has since steadily and dangerously moved 
to a more flexible, but inconsistent approach, including the "test of 
effectiveness" expounded in R. v. Chaulk. 19 Rather than requiring Charter 
11 Charter Justice, supra note 8 at 4; Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] 
A.C. 124 at 136 (P.C.). 
12 Ibid. at 6; Public Service Alliance of Canada v. The Queen, [1984] 2 F.C. 889 at 894 
(Fed. C.A.). 
l3 Charter Justice, ibid.. at 4-8. 
14 Ibid. at 21-22. 
15 Ibid. at 23-31. 
16 Ibid. at 32-33. 
17 Ibid. at 33-35. 
ls (1986), 50 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
19 (1991), 2 C.R. (4th) 1at32 (S.C.C.). 
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limitations to be as minimally intrusive as possible, Chaulk asks "whether a less 
intrusive means ... would achieve the same objective as effectively."20 Stuart 
argues that, given the criminal context, this test inappropriately relaxes the 
burden of justification on the state. He further argues that it is out of step with 
other judicial rulings, including those on constructive murder and the rape shield 
law. 
The subsequent chapters address individual Charter rights, reviewing the 
issues and the law surrounding each right. The rights examined are those falling 
under the "legal rights" heading of the Charter, ss. 7-14, and the "equality 
rights" in s. 15. Section 24 remedies are analyzed in the final chapter of the 
book. Again, Stuart provides insightful critical commentary where the courts 
have been indecisive or have produced, in his opinion, bad law. For example, he 
criticizes the current uncertainty surrounding the pre-trial right to silence under 
s. 7, and the extent to which the courts permit undercover police to try to extract 
incriminating evidence from persons under arrest.21 lri the same vein, he argues 
that the police should be required to advise accused persons of their right to 
silence.22 With respect to s. 8, Stuart points out the need for a comprehensive 
legislative scheme to clarify police search and seizure powers.23 In each of these 
areas, greater certainty in the law, Stuart notes, is in the interest of both the 
police and the policed; the uncertainty of the common law is incompatible with 
the immediate and often dangerous demands of policing and threatens the civil 
liberties of citizens. 
Other sections of the Charter, including s. 2 (fundamental freedoms), s. 19 
(language rights), and, although technically not part of the Charter, s. 35 
(aboriginal and treaty rights), would have merited examination because the 
criminal courts are also faced with litigation on these sections. This is clearly a 
shortcoming of the book, particularly in view of the high profile nature and 
political significance of some of the issues being "resolved" under these 
sections. Three such cases come to mind: R. v. Zundef,24 R. v. Keegstrms 
(freedom of expression, s. 2(b)), and R. v. Sparrow26 (aboriginal and treaty 
rights, s. 35). These cases have forced the courts to redirect policy-making away 
from traditional criminal law principles, into less certain areas of the law. To be 
fair, however, because of the paucity of the case law and the indecisiveness of 
20 Ibid. 
21 Supra note 8 at 94-95. 
22 Ibid. at 95. 
23 Ibid. at 141. 
24 (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.). 
25 (1990), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
26 (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 263 (S.C.C.). 
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the courts in adjudicating some of these issues, there is no meaningful body of 
law under these rights and guarantees. Nonetheless, these matters are before the 
criminal courts and should, therefore, be included in any book such as Stuart's 
that seeks to clarify Charter jurisprudence in Canadian criminal law. 
A second shortcoming is Stuart's tendency to rely principally on judicial 
decisions to explain and assess the meaning of Charter rights. Although he 
points to additional critical commentary in his footnotes, these arguments could 
be incorporated to a greater extent in the body of the text, providing the reader 
with a broader perspective of the issues that have arisen around each Charter 
right. The separation of case law from critical commentary, however, apart from 
Stuart's own discussion, allows the book to maintain a sharper focus while also 
providing readers who require additional critical observations with the relevant 
secondary sources. 
Overall, Charter Justice provides the reader with a very useful and thorough 
introduction to the application of the Charter in Canadian criminal courts, and to 
the principles which have emerged from the constitutionalization of criminal law 
doctrine. The book is a welcome addition to Canadian criminal legal literature. 
